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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine inflation targeting (IT) in emerging countries by 
concentrating essentially on the case of Brazil. The IT monetary policy regime has been 
adopted by a significant number of countries. While the focus of this paper is on Brazil, 
which began inflation targeting in 1999, we also examine the experience of other countries, 
both for comparative purposes and for evidence of the extent of this “new” economic 
policy’s success. In addition, we compare the experience of Brazil with that of non-IT 
countries, and ask the question of whether adopting IT makes a difference in the fight 
against inflation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the inflation targeting (IT) framework and the 
experience with it in the case of Brazil. IT as a new monetary policy framework has been 
adopted by a significant number of countries (see, for example, Angeriz and Arestis [2007a, 
2007b, 2008]). Brazil adopted this economic policy framework in June 1999. While the 
focus of this paper is on Brazil, we also examine the experience of other countries, both for 
comparative purposes and for evidence of the extent of the success of this “new” economic 
policy pursued by other IT countries. In addition, we compare Brazil’s experience with IT 
with that of non-IT countries and ask the question of whether it makes a difference in the 
fight against inflation whether a country has adopted IT or not. 
  We proceed as follows. Section 2 deals with the more theoretical aspects of the IT 
framework. This is followed in section 3 by an examination of recent stabilization policies 
in Brazil; this enables us to demonstrate how Brazil came to implementing the IT strategy. 
Section 4 concentrates on the Brazilian experience with IT, while section 5 is concerned 
with a comparison of the Brazilian IT experience with that of other “similar” IT-emerging 
countries. The latter group includes both countries within Latin America and other 
countries outside Latin America. The experience of non-IT countries is also examined. 
Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes.   
 
2. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF INFLATION TARGETING 
 
There are a number of theoretical aspects that are the backbone of IT. We examine both the 
main theoretical elements of IT and certain key operational aspects. 
 
2.1 Main Theoretical Elements 
This subsection summarizes the main theoretical elements of IT. There are six such 
elements as follows:  
 
(i) IT is a monetary policy framework whereby public announcement of official inflation 
targets (or target ranges) is undertaken along with explicit acknowledgement that price 
stability (meaning low and stable inflation) is monetary policy’s primary long-term   3
objective (King 2002). The price stability goal may be accompanied by output stabilization 
so long as price stability is not violated. An explicit numerical target for inflation is 
published (either as a point or a range), as well as a time horizon for reaching the inflation 
target. Such a monetary policy framework improves communication between the public, 
businesses, and markets on the one hand, and policy-makers on the other hand, as well as 
providing discipline, accountability, transparency, and flexibility in monetary policy. The 
focus is on price stability, along with three objectives: credibility (the framework should 
command trust); flexibility (the framework should allow monetary policy to react optimally 
to unanticipated shocks); and legitimacy (the framework should attract public and 
parliamentary support). In fact, credibility is recognized as paramount in the conduct of 
monetary policy to avoid problems associated with time inconsistency (Barro and Gordon 
1983). It is argued that a policy that lacks credibility because of time inconsistency is 
neither optimal nor feasible (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Calvo 1978; Barro and Gordon 
1983). 
 
(ii) A further role of IT is to “lock in” the gains from “taming” inflation. Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999: 288) are explicit on this issue when they argue that “one of the main 
benefits of inflation targets is that they may help to ‘lock in’ earlier disinflationary gains, 
particularly in the face of one-time inflationary shocks.” In an important contribution, 
though, Johnson (2003) finds rather mixed results for this contention; he compares actual 
forecasts with predicted forecasts undertaken by professional forecasters for five 
consecutive twelve-month periods after the announcement of inflation targets. The study 
isolates the additional effect of the announcement of inflation targets on the level of 
expected inflation in the case of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. 
Immediate reduction in expected inflation is registered in New Zealand and Sweden, with a 
smaller effect and slower impact in Australia and Canada; inflation targets do not appear to 
have a significant impact in the UK. 
 
(iii) In this framework, monetary policy is taken as the main instrument of macroeconomic 
policy. Fiscal policy is no longer viewed as a powerful macroeconomic instrument (in any 
case, it is hostage to the slow and uncertain legislative processes); in this way, “monetary   4
policy moves first and dominates, forcing fiscal policy to align with monetary policy” 
(Mishkin 2000: 4). Monetary policy is a flexible instrument for achieving medium-term 
stabilization objectives in that it can be adjusted quickly in response to macroeconomic 
developments. Indeed, monetary policy is viewed as the most direct determinant of 
inflation, so much so that in the long run the inflation rate is the only macroeconomic 
variable that monetary policy can affect. Monetary policy cannot affect economic activity 
(for example, output, employment, etc.) in the long run.  
 
(iv) Monetary policy should not be operated by politicians, but by experts (whether banks, 
economists, or others) in the form of an “independent” central bank. Politicians would be 
tempted to use monetary policy for short-term gain (lower unemployment) at the expense 
of long-term loss (higher inflation)—the time-inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott 
1977). An “independent” central bank would also have greater credibility in the financial 
markets and be seen to have a stronger commitment to low inflation than politicians do. 
There is also the question of instrument independence when the monetary policy instrument 
is under the control of the independent central bank, as well as goal independence when the 
independent central bank sets the goal of monetary policy (Debelle and Fischer 1994; 
Fischer 1994). It is argued that instrument independence is preferable to insulate the 
independent central bank from time-inconsistent policies. However, in terms of the goals of 
monetary policy, it is thought that an independent central bank should be goal dependent so 
that its long-run preferences coincide with society’s preferences (Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist 1999), in other words, the independent central bank’s preferences coincide with 
those of the elected government.  
 
(v) A mechanism for openness, transparency, and accountability should be in place with 
respect to monetary policy formulation. Openness and transparency in the conduct of 
monetary policy improve credibility. IT central banks publish inflation reports that might 
include not only an outlook for inflation, but also output and other macroeconomic 
variables, along with an assessment of economic conditions. There should also be some 
accountability mechanism. If the inflation target is not met, there should be specific steps in 
place for the central bank to follow; this may include publishing an explanation or   5
submitting a letter to the government explaining the reasons for missing the target and how 
to return to it. Furthermore, transparency reduces uncertainty about the central bank’s 
preferences, which is expected to lead to lower expected rate of inflation.  
 
(vi) In the case of inflation targeting in an open economy, exchange rate considerations are 
of crucial importance, and we highlight this aspect in the case of emerging countries (Brazil 
in particular) in what follows in this paper. They transmit the effects of changes in the 
policy instrument, interest rates, and various foreign shocks. Given this critical role of the 
exchange rate in the transmission process of monetary policy, excessive fluctuations in 
interest rates can produce excessive variability in output by inducing significant changes in 
exchange rates. This may suggest exchange rate targeting. However, the experience of a 
number of developing countries that pursued exchange rate targeting (but experienced 
financial crises because their policies were not perceived as credible) is relevant to the 
argument. The adoption of IT, by contrast, may lead to a more stable currency since it 
signals a clear commitment to price stability in a freely floating exchange rate system. This, 
of course, does not mean that monitoring exchange rate developments should not be 
undertaken. Indeed, weighting them into decisions on setting monetary policy instruments 
is thought desirable. Such an approach is thought to make undesirable exchange rate 
fluctuations less likely, thereby promoting the objective of financial and price stability 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1999). 
 
2.2 Operational Aspects 
In terms of the IT operational framework, a number of issues suggest themselves. To begin 
with, there is the establishment of inflation targets. This is the setting of a point target or a 
band and choosing the time period over which the target is expected to be achieved. It is 
important to note that the target horizon (over which the central bank is expected to achieve 
its inflation target) cannot be shorter than the control horizon (over which the policy is 
expected to affect the target variable). Clearly, choosing a range as opposed to a point for 
the inflation target contains a great deal of flexibility, not only for output stabilization, but 
also for accommodating large movements in the nominal exchange rate; this is a 
particularly thorny issue in the case of emerging countries and Brazil, in particular, as   6
shown below. In those cases where a range is chosen, there is the question of 
symmetrical/asymmetrical response with respect to the central target. Symmetrical behavior 
purports to show equal concern for both inflation and deflation, and helps to maintain 
support for central bank independence. An asymmetric approach to inflation targeting may 
be advantageous when high inflation rates threaten credibility. This is often the case for 
developing and emerging countries adopting inflation targeting. A greater weight on 
overshoots than undershoots in the loss function is suggested under these circumstances.  
  IT also requires the setting up of a model or methodology that can provide 
information on future inflation, an issue that relates to the necessity of forecasting inflation. 
There is also the key issue of how to measure inflation. A relevant question in this context 
is whether the chosen price index should reflect the prices of goods and services for current 
consumption only, or for both current and future consumption. In the latter case 
constructing such a price index is, of course, not feasible. Then there is the problem of 
noisy or erratic short-run movements in prices, which suggest that an adjusted or core 
(long-term) price index should be used. Such an index might exclude from the general or 
headline price index items such as food and energy prices, shocks to the exchange rate, 
indirect taxes, or regulated prices on the assumption that such changes are the result of 
temporary and self-correcting, short-term shocks that contain very little information on 
long-term price movements. Another important excluded category of items relates to 
changes directly associated with the policy change. Items that vary directly with the policy 
instrument, such as mortgage payments, may be excluded from the definition of the 
targeted price index. Such effects, however, may contain significant and protracted second-
round effects. For example, a rise in indirect taxes that temporarily lowers inflation can 
affect aggregate demand, which may lower prices in the long run, thereby implying an 
important loss of information on future price developments. 
  There is still the question of the trade-off between reducing deviations of inflation 
from the target and preventing a high degree of output variability. This is particularly 
pertinent in the case of supply shocks that cause inflation to exceed the target and are 
associated at the same time with lower output. Monetary authorities have a serious dilemma 
in these circumstances: the quicker the disinflation, the shorter the period of actual inflation 
being above its target; the quicker disinflation is, the greater the potential output variability.   7
A policy preference and the magnitude of the supply shock are both important determinants 
of this trade-off. Flexibility is required in this context, which, however, may conflict with 
credibility if agents interpret it as reluctance by the central bank to deflate. There is, thus, 
another trade-off in this case between credibility and flexibility (Garfinkel and Oh 1993). 
  This discussion highlights another important operational aspect. This relates to the 
question of monetary rules. Central banks, on the whole, are assumed to follow one form or 
another of the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). In its original formulation this monetary rule took 
the ad hoc formulation as shown in equation (1):  
 
 R t   = RR* + p
T + d1Y
g
t + d2(pt-1 – p
T)       ( 1 )  
 
where the symbols are as follows: R is the rate of interest used for monetary control 
purposes, p
T is desired inflation in the original Taylor (1993) formulation (in current 
parlance, it is the inflation target set by the central bank), Y
g is output gap (i.e., the 
difference between actual and potential output), and p is actual inflation. Equations of the 
type depicted in equation (1) are called Taylor rules, since Taylor (1993) showed that a 
simple equation of this form, with d1 = 0.5 and d2  = 1.5, captures surprisingly well the 
behavior of the U.S. federal-funds rate and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) monetary 
policy. The nominal rate is increased more than one-to-one with respect to any increase in 
inflation. This policy reaction ensures that the real rate of interest will act to lower inflation. 
Given inflation, the real rate of interest is also increased as a result of output-gap positive 
changes. Taylor rules, therefore, require monetary policy to act automatically to inflation 
and output. These Taylor-type rules have been criticized (for example, Svensson [2004]) in 
terms of the possibility of real indeterminacy: if the rise in the nominal rate of interest in 
response to a rise in expected inflation is not high enough, then the real rate of interest falls, 
raising demand, which fails to check inflation. Mutatis mutandis, an excessive rise in the 
nominal rate of interest in response to a rise in expected inflation would also cause 
indeterminacy. However, indeterminacy can be avoided if monetary authorities respond 
rather aggressively, that is, with a coefficient above unity to expected inflation, but not 
overly higher than unity. This result has been demonstrated in the closed-economy case   8
(Clarida, Gertler, and Galí 2000), as well as in the small open-economy case (De Fiore and 
Liu 2002).  
 
3. RECENT BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE: FROM THE EXCHANGE RATE 
ANCHOR TO INFLATION TARGETING  
 
Stabilization policies in Brazil and, more generally, in Latin American countries in the 
1990s were based on some form of exchange rate anchor. Liberalization of the trade, 
financial, and capital accounts was thought paramount. The experience with those programs 
showed that although they were successful in ending the history of chronically high 
inflation, they showed, nonetheless, that local currency appreciation as a result of favorable 
differentials between domestic and foreign prices was causing balance of payments 
disequilibria. A new problem emerged that was closely related to the endeavor to achieve 
and maintain balance of payments equilibria. This problem was the use of high interest 
rates by monetary authorities to attract foreign capital. The need to maintain high interest 
rates in order to attract foreign capital increased public internal debt (monetary authorities 
had to sterilize the inflow of foreign capital), which deteriorated economic performance and 
fiscal balances. Under these conditions in a global world where financial and productive 
capital are mobile, the successful application of an internal stabilization policy generated an 
endogenous process of deteriorating economic conditions. That, then, left Latin American 
countries vulnerable to speculative attacks on their currencies and, thus, subjected them to 
currency crises (Kregel 1999). The currency crises in Mexico (1994–95), Brazil (1998–99, 
and 2002), and Argentina (2001–02) are some good examples of this dynamic process. The 
unhappy experience of some Latin American countries with pegged exchange rate regimes 
and the associated era of deep financial crises in the 1990s led them to search for alternative 
nominal anchors. Since at more or less the same time several industrial countries adopted  
IT as a new monetary policy framework, it became an alternative policy regime for 
countries in Latin America.
1  
                                                 
1 In fact, IT was adopted by Chile in 1990, Mexico in 1999, Colombia in 1999, Brazil in 1999, and Peru in 
2002.   9
   The “Real Plan”
2 in Brazil was created on the same basis as the stabilization 
programs applied all over Latin America over the period of the late 1980s to the late 1990s. 
This system was characterized by a fixed or crawling-peg exchange rate, in combination 
with a more open trade policy. The exchange rate was the price anchor utilized throughout 
that period.
3 During the exchange rate anchor period, very high interest rates were targeted  
to attract short-term foreign capital for balance-of-payments purposes. The volume of those 
capital flows was many times greater than the volume required for the needs of the balance 
of payments, thus raising the level of foreign reserves and leading to a real appreciation of 
the exchange rate.
4 That appreciation resulted in a significant balance of trade deficit. The 
effect of that liberal economic policy arrangement aggravated Brazil’s external fragility 
and, consequently, the country had three speculative attacks on its currency over the three-
year period from 1995 to 1998. Furthermore, from the third quarter of 1998 to the first 
quarter of 1999, the Brazilian economy was characterized by macroeconomic instability, 
resulting in a sharp outflow of short-term capital. Thus, repeated financial crises in a very 
short period of time (i.e., the South East Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, along with the 
international recession of 1997–1998) contributed to deteriorating the Brazilian economy. 
In fact, as a result of the effects of the Russian crisis in particular, Brazil was forced to 
abandon its crawling-peg exchange rate and adopt a floating exchange rate regime. The 
exchange rate depreciated as a result, thereby producing significant price pass-through 
effects with inevitable adverse consequences on the inflation front.  
  Following the transition to a floating exchange rate in January 1999, Brazil adopted 
an IT regime in June 1999 to keep inflation under control. At the same time, the Central 
Bank of Brazil (BCB) raised the basic short-term interest rate to accommodate the 
currency-depreciation shock. As a result, an appreciation to the exchange rate occurred very 
                                                 
2 The real is the currency unit of Brazil. 
3 The Brazilian Real Plan differed from Argentina’s Convertibility Plan in that it adopted a more flexible 
exchange rate anchor. At the launch of the Brazilian program in July 1994, the government’s commitment 
was to maintain an exchange rate ceiling of one-to-one parity with the dollar. Moreover, the relationship 
between changes in the monetary base and foreign reserve movements was not explicitly stated, allowing 
some discretionary leeway. After the Mexican crisis, the exchange rate policy was reviewed and, in the 
context of a crawling exchange rate range, the nominal rate began to undergo gradual devaluation. In early 
1999, however, after six months of speculative pressure, the real was devalued and, some days later, the 
Brazilian government adopted a floating exchange rate. For a general analysis of the origins and development 
of the Real Plan, see Ferrari-Filho and Paula (2003). 
4 During the pegged exchange rate period, July 1994 to January 1999, the basic interest rate (Selic) was raised 
and kept at high levels in order to avoid large outflow of reserves.   10
fast, and inflation, despite the huge devaluation in the beginning of 1999, ended the year in 
single figures. 
 
4. THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH INFLATION TARGETING FROM 1999 
TO 2007 
 
4.1 The Institutional Dimension 
The Brazilian IT monetary policy regime is modeled on the basis of the British IT model. 
The National Monetary Council (CMN) sets the inflation targets, which are proposed by the 
minister of finance. CMN has three members: the minister of finance, the minister of 
planning, and the president of the BCB. All three members are appointed by the president 
of Brazil and do not have fixed mandates. In June of each year, the CMN establishes the 
inflation targets and their corresponding intervals of tolerance for the next two years. 
Besides the inflation target, CMN is also responsible for the approval of the main norms 
related to monetary and exchange rate policies, as well as the regulation of the financial 
system. 
  The Central Bank of Brazil Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) has to achieve 
the inflation target through the use of the short-term interest rate.
5 Inflation targets are 
based on the headline inflation index, i.e., extensive national consumer price index 
(IPCA).
6 A certain degree of flexibility is introduced through defining IT within a range 
that has varied between 2.0 or 2.5 percentage points above and below the central point 
target. The other main reason for the introduction of this flexibility is that it helps the 
Central Bank of Brazil to achieve its inflation target in view of the serious supply shocks to 
which the Brazilian economy is exposed. 
  The inflation target is fulfilled when the yearly variation of the inflation index is 
inside the set range. If inflation breaches the target set by the CMN, the governor of the 
BCB is required to write an open letter to the minister of finance explaining the reasons the 
                                                 
5 COPOM was created on June 20, 1996 and was assigned the responsibility of setting the stance of monetary 
policy and the short-term interest rate. It is composed of the members of the BCB’s board of directors. 
6 IPCA covers a sample of families with a multiple of up to 40 times the minimum wage, which is determined 
every year by the Brazilian federal government. It now stands at approximately US$260 per month (beginning 
of August 2008) and it is thought to be enough to cover the basic needs of a family. The sample covered by 
IPCA has a broad geographical basis that includes families in the biggest cities of Brazil. IPCA is calculated 
by National Bureau of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).   11
target was missed, as well as the measures proposed to bring it back to target and the time 
period over which these measures are expected to take effect. The interest rate target set by 
the COPOM is the target for the Selic interest rate—the interest rate for overnight interbank 
loans, collateralized by those government bonds that are registered with and traded on the 
“Sistema Especial de Liquidação e Custodia” (Selic). The Selic target is fixed for the period 
between its regular meetings. The governor of the BCB, however, has the right to alter the 
Selic interest rate target anytime between regular COPOM meetings (once per month). This 
is made possible by the COPOM, which has the right to introduce a monetary policy bias at 
its regular meetings, where the bias refers to easing or tightening of monetary policy 
outside meetings. The COPOM authorizes the governor of the BCB to alter the SELIC 
interest rate target in the direction of the bias at anytime between regular COPOM 
meetings. Eight days after each meeting, the committee releases the minutes on the BCB 
website and to the press through the BCB press officer. The minutes provide a summary of 
the COPOM’s discussion and decisions. At the end of each quarter (March, June, 
September, and December), the COPOM publishes the BCB inflation report, which 
provides detailed information on economic conditions, as well as the COPOM’s inflation 
forecasts upon which changes in the Selic interest rate are determined. The objective of this 
report is to inform the public and the market about the goals, design, and implementation of 
monetary policy.  
 
4.2 Experience with Inflation Targeting 
Table 1 shows actual inflation and the targets for 1999–2007. From 1999 (when IT was 
introduced in Brazil) to 2002, the tolerance intervals were 2 percentage points above and 
below the central target; for 2003 and 2004 the intervals were enlarged to 2.5 percentage 
points.
7 The inflation rate was 8.9% and 6.0% for targets of 8% and 6% in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively; the targets were within the acceptable range. However, in 2001 and 2002, 
several external and domestic shocks—such as domestic energy crisis in Brazil, effects of  
September 11, 2001, the Argentine crisis, and the confidence crisis related to the 
presidential election in 2002—hit the Brazilian economy with significant impacts on 
                                                 
7 For more information on the macroeconomic background that led to the shift of IT in Brazil, see Bogdanki, 
Tombini, and Werlang (2000).   12
inflation. Indeed, the inflation rate reached 7.7% in 2001, 1.7% above the target’s upper 
range, and 12.5% in 2002, more than 5 percentage points above the upper range. According 
to Minella et al. (2003: 6–8), the exchange rate rose 20.3% and 53.5% in 2001 and 2002, 
respectively. As a result, in 2001, 38% of the inflation rate could be explained by the 
exchange rate depreciation, whereas for 2002 the contribution of the exchange rate stood at 
46%.
8 In 2003, the inflation rate was 9.3% above the adjusted target of 4.0% and outside 
the range of 2.5% tolerance interval.
9 The high inflation in 2003 was due mainly to the 
initial effect of the 2002 high inflation, in spite of the maintenance of the conservative 
economic policy with very high interest rates by the new president, Lula da Silva, from the 
Workers Party. In 2004, IPCA was 7.6%, well above the target of 5.5%. Growth of 
administered prices (mainly gasoline, health plans, fixed telephone, and electricity rates) in 
the same year reached 10.2%, accounting for 29.0% of the change in the IPCA or, 
equivalently, 2.94% out of 10.2%. In 2005, the inflation rate was 5.7%, which was within 
the upper and lower tolerance levels for inflation set by the CMN for that year. The factors 
that influenced the lower growth rate in prices (mainly in market prices) in 2005 were, 
among others, an abundant supply of farm products (rice, perishable foodstuffs, and 
soybean) and, especially, exchange rate appreciation. In 2006, the inflation rate was 
3.14%—it was the lowest inflation rate in the period 1999–2007. Once again, the exchange 
rate appreciation explains the low inflation rate for 2006. Finally, in 2007, the inflation rate 





                                                 
8 The calculations of Minella et al. (2003) are based on the structural model of the BCB and the information 
concerning the mechanisms for the adjustment of administered prices.  
9 CMN Resolution No. 2972, June 27, 2002, changed the inflation targets for 2003, while a later resolution, 
No. 3108, June 25, 2003, changed inflation targets for 2004. They were raised to 4.0% and 5.5% for 2003 and 
2004, from the original inflation targets of 3.25% and 3.75%, respectively. 
10 It is important to mention that high real interest rates, combined with the current account surplus from 2005 
to 2007, resulted in a gradual appreciation of the Brazilian exchange rate that contributed to the reduction of 
the inflation rate. As we know, exchange rates can influence inflation rate (“exchange rate pass-through”) 
through the prices of traded final goods and imported intermediate goods, and their impact on agent’s 
inflation expectations. Ho and McCauley (2003), for instance, show evidences that: (i) income is negatively 
and significantly correlated with pass-through as lower-income economies have a larger portion of traded 
goods in the consumption basket; and (ii) exchange rate pass-through has tended to be stronger in Latin 
America than in Asia.   13






Range of Inflation 
Target 
Actual IPCA 
1999  8.0%  From 6.0 to 10.0%  8.94% 
2000  6.0%  From 4.0 to 8.0%  5.97% 
2001  4.0%  From 2.0 to a 6.0%  7.67% 
2002  3.5%  From 1.5 to 5.5%  12.53% 
2003  4.05  From 1.5 to 6.5
a 9.30% 
2004  5.5%  From 3.0 to 8.0%
b  7.60% 
2005  4.5%  From 2.0 a 7.0%  5.69% 
2006  4.5%  From 2.5 to 6.5%  3.14% 
2007  4.5%  From 2.5 to 6.5%  4.46% 
 
Notes: (a) The original inflation target was 3.25% (with a tolerance interval of 
2.0%). Subsequently, in 2003, the BCB decided to change the inflation target 
to the maximum limit of 8.5%; (b) The original inflation target for the year 
2004 was 3.75% (with a tolerance interval of 2.5%). 
Source: BCB (2008)  
 
  Examining table 1 more closely, further comments are in order. It is notable that 
over the period 1999–2007, IT targets in Brazil were within the set range in three out of the 
nine years of the operation of this monetary policy strategy. The targets were missed in 
2001, 2002, and 2003 (despite raising the inflation target to 5.5% from 3.75%) by a 
substantial margin, especially in 2002. On a different occasion (2004), the inflation target 
was only met after it had been raised by mid-2003. It may, thus, be concluded that IT in 
Brazil was not completely successful over the first nine years of its implementation. 
Moreover, inflation targets were only met when international financial conditions allowed 
it; that is, IT was successful when the exchange rate helped the BCB’s efforts to keep 
inflation under control.
11 This begs the question of whether this result can be sustained 
when Brazil’s IT performance is compared with that of other emerging countries, both 
                                                 
11 For more details on the influence of the exchange rate on inflation in Brazil, see Barbosa-Filho (2007).   14
within Latin America and outside it, and also both with IT and non-IT countries. In section 
5 (below) we undertake this particular exercise. We look into further data in an attempt to 
prepare the discussion of section 5. 
 
4.3 Inflation, GDP, and Unemployment Performance in Brazil: 1999 to 2007   
The average inflation rate in Brazil from 1999 to 2007 was 7.2%. This means that the 
average inflation rate in Brazil is still high. Furthermore, Brazil’s GDP performance has 
been poor. When we consider the period of IT implementation (1999 to 2007), the average 
growth rate of GDP was only 3.0%, while during the same period the average growth rate 
of emerging countries was 5.1% per year (according to Fabris [2007]). In addition, GDP 
has followed a stop-go pattern over this period: according to IPEA data (table 2), GDP 
growth was 0.3% in 1999, 4.3% in 2000, 1.3% in 2001, 2.7% in 2002, 1.1% in 2003, 5.7% 
in 2004, 3.1% in 2005, 3.7% in 2006, and 5.4% in 2007. The variance is 1.8, indicating 
quite high variation. Table 2 also shows the average unemployment rate during the 
inflation-targeting period in Brazil. From 1999 to 2007, the average unemployment rate, 
according to IBGE (2008) data, was 9.3% per year. 
 
TABLE 2. GDP Growth and Unemployment Rates in Brazil (average rate per year, in 
%)  
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
GDP Growth 
Rate  0.3  4.3  1.3  2.7  1.1    5.7  3.1    3.7  5.4  3.0 
Unemployment 
Rate  8.3 7.9 6.8 7.9 12.3 11.5  9.8  10.0  9.3  9.3 
Sources: IPEADATA (2008) and IBGE (2008) 
 
  Turning to the rate of interest over the period of the IT regime, it is clear that it has 
been very high in Brazil, even after the adoption of the exchange rate regime in January 
1999. The average nominal basic interest rate (Selic) was 18.3% over the period 1999 to 
2007 (figure 1), while the average real interest rate (Selic/IPCA) during this period was 
10.3%. It was so high because of the monetary policy requirement that aimed at keeping 
inflation under control and stabilizing the exchange rate volatility. Indeed, empirical studies 
show that the monetary authorities use interest rate not only to control inflation directly, but   15
also to control exchange rate pressures, with evident “fear of floating” behavior.
12 On the 
other hand, the literature that estimates the reaction function of the BCB (after the adoption 
of IT) shows that the BCB reaction to inflation has been asymmetric: (i) the increase in the 
inflation rate generates a more than proportional reaction of the Selic; and (ii) BCB reacts 
very gradually (it reduces the Selic very slowly) when there is a fall in the inflation rate 
and/or a sharp reduction in the output growth.
13 The consequences of high interest rates are: 
(i) serious constraints on economic growth through the price of credit (loan rates) and 
entrepreneurs’ poor expectations; and (ii) increases in public debt, which have been formed 
mainly by indexed bonds or short-term prefixed bonds.
14 Despite the significant 
improvement in the balance of payment figures since 2003, due essentially to the surplus in 
the trade balance increasing, Brazil’s recent experience shows that in countries with a high 
level of external debt and a fully-liberalized capital account, external capital flows can 
cause periods of intense exchange rate instability.
15 This can jeopardize efforts to achieve 
and maintain announced inflation targets. This situation has also caused low economic 
growth because monetary authorities tend to increase interest rates during periods of 









                                                 
12 Mendonça (2005), using a Taylor rule to study the determination of interest rate by the BCB over the period 
1999–2004, finds that exchange rate changes explained a great deal of the variation of the Selic interest rate 
(around 57% after one year of the exchange rate shock in 2003). 
13 According to Modenesi (2008: 21), the weight of the autoregressive components of the BCB reaction 
function (α1 + α2 = 0.92) is much higher than the Federal Reserve System reaction function during the 
Volcker-Greenspan period (α1 + α2 = 0.79).  
14 The behavior of the domestic public debt in Brazil has proved particularly vulnerable to changes in the rate 
of interest and exchange rate (see, in this regard, Paula and Alves Jr. [2003]). 
15 According to data from BCB, the ratio of external debt to exports declined from 3.6 in 2001 to 1.5 in 2007 
due to the recent increase in exports, and the ratio of foreign reserves to external debt increased from 17.1 in 
2001 to 75.9 in 2007.   16
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  In Brazil, exchange rate volatility has been considerable
16 (figure 2). 
Macroeconomic instability brought a strong currency devaluation of the real, which, as a 
result, affected domestic prices via the exchange rate pass-through. This came about 
through the direct impact of devaluation on the imported inputs or indirectly through the 
“monitored” prices. Monitored or administered prices are defined as those that are 
relatively insensitive to domestic demand and supply conditions, or that are in some way 
regulated by a public agency. The group includes oil by-products, telephone fees, 
residential electricity, and public transportation. Its dynamics differ from those of market 
prices in three ways: “i) dependence on international prices in the case of oil by-products; 
ii) greater pass-through from the exchange rate; and iii) stronger backward-looking 
behavior” (Minella et al. 2003: 7), as electricity and telephone rates are generally adjusted 
annually by the general price index (IGP).
17 Furthermore, figure 3 shows that administered 
                                                 
16 Souza and Hoff (2006), using Calvo-Reihart’s fear of floating indicators, show that from January 1999 to 
December 2005 the frequency that monthly variation of exchange rate exceeded the band of ± 2.5% was 52% 
in Brazil, compared to 27% in other emerging countries of Latin America, and 19% in Asian emerging 
countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and South Korea). 
17 IGP is prepared by Getulio Vargas Foundation, a private foundation, and it is calculated through a weighted 
index that includes the wholesale price index (60.0%), consumer price index (30.0%), and national index of 
building costs (10.0%). The reason for the use of this index to adjust electricity and telephones rates (instead 
of IPCA) is that when these services were privatized in the second half of the 1990s, the Brazilian government   17
prices increased more than market prices from 1999 to 2006. In 2007, however, market 
prices increased more than administered prices.  
 
FIGURE 2. Volatility of the Exchange Rate, R$/USD, and Inflation Rates, 
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Note: Volatility of exchange rate was calculated as the difference between average annual exchange rate 
and the monthly average exchange rate.       
















                                                                                                                                                     
was interested in attracting foreign firms and, for these firms, IGP is better than IPCA, as it is much more 
sensitive to exchange rate variations (due to the high weight of the wholesale price on it).   18
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Note: Administered prices include utilities services (fixed-telephone fees, residential electricity, etc.), 
oil by-products, and private health plans, that is, prices that are or determined (or authorized) directly 
by government or by governmental permission that includes some sort of price indexation. 
Source: IPEADATA (2008) 
 
  A final comment on the transmission channel from exchange rate to inflation in 
Brazil is in order. Exchange rate variations affect the IGP, which, in turn, affects the index 
of administered prices. As administered prices change, IPCA is also affected.
18 IPCA is 
also affected directly by exchange rate changes due to their effects on the imported inputs. 
Since IGP has been higher than IPCA, the latter has been influenced by the IGP behavior 
through administered price adjustments (see figure 2). On the other hand, periods of 
appreciation of the exchange rate have resulted in a decrease in the rate of inflation (after a 
time lag). As we show above, the decline in the inflation rate in 2005 and 2006 (compared 
to 2003 and 2004) is basically related to the exchange rate appreciation over the period, so 
inflation in Brazil is very much influenced by exchange rate movements.
19 Under these 
                                                 
18 Minella et al. (2003: 25) estimated that the pass-through to administered prices from July 1997 until 
December 2002 was 25%, resulting in a pass-through of about 16% for the headline IPCA. 
19 Ferreira (2004), using a VAR model to evaluate the determinants of the rate of inflation in Brazil in 1995–
2004, finds a positive response of inflation to shocks in nominal exchange rate, an effect that spreads over 
time. In the same connection, Gomes and Aidar (2005) estimate (using a VAR) a Taylor rule for the Brazilian 
economy from January 1999 to May 2004 and conclude that 24.4% of the inflation rate (IPCA) variation is 
explained by the exchange rate. It is interesting that some economists of the BCB also conclude that 
“exchange rate volatility is an important source of inflation variability. The design of the inflation-targeting   19
conditions, monetary policy may have some effect on market-determined prices, but it is 
not very effective in controlling administered prices. Consequently, in view of the 
importance of administered prices in the determination of the Brazilian inflation rate, 
inflation pressures result in the BCB having to increase interest rates higher than might be 
necessary to restrain inflation that derives from market prices. This is because the BCB has 
to account for the secondary effects that emanate from the shocks of monitored prices.
20  
  The argument may be briefly summarized: inflation in Brazil has been mainly cost-
determined, explained by negative or positive supply shocks (movements in the exchange 
rate, changes in the international prices of commodities and energy, etc.) and by partial 
inertia due to the indexation of the administered prices. 
 
5. COMPARING THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER “SIMILAR” 
COUNTRIES  
 
We compare the experience of Brazil with other countries with the help of tables 3 and 4, 
which contain data on inflation and GDP (average, standard deviation, and coefficient of 
variation).
21 Two groups of countries are examined: one is a group of emerging countries 
that have adopted IT (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and South Africa) and another 
group comprised of countries that have not adopted the IT strategy (Argentina, China, 
India, and Russia). So, we have selected the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China), plus South Africa and the more important Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, besides Brazil). Standard deviations and 
coefficients of variation can be sometimes misleading, as, for example, in the case of 
China, where a high inflation standard deviation is present as a result of a sharp decline of 
high to low inflation, although this country has had a very low inflation since the late 
1990s. It is for this reason that we also report data on inflation in figures 4 and 6 by 
                                                                                                                                                     
framework has to take into account this issue to avoid [the possibility of not meeting] inflation targets as a 
result of exchange rate volatility [which is bound to reduce] the credibility of the central bank” (Minella et al. 
2003: 29). 
20 The credit channel is also limited in Brazil since the ratio of credit to GDP has been around 24–35% from 
2000–07, according to data from Central Bank of Brazil (2008), while it was 45.3% in the United States, 
84.7% in Japan, and 103.7% in the euro area in 2000 (Belaisch 2003). 
21 The coefficient of variation is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation over the average of the 
variable in question.   20
countries that adopt IT and those that do not adopt IT, respectively. These figures are very 
important for the analysis since they report inflation trends in each country.  
 
The following observations are in order: 
 
(a) Inspection of tables 3 and 4 clearly shows that the fall of inflation is a recent general 
tendency in emerging countries, whether or not they adopt an IT regime (see also, figures 4 
and 6).
22 Although in all IT-emerging countries the rate of inflation declined after the 
adoption of IT, in most of them the coefficient of variation increased (table 3). It is also true 
that countries that did not adopt IT experienced improvements around the same time as IT 
countries (table 4). Indeed, some emerging non-IT countries, such as China and India, have 
had low inflation rates in the last few years. Argentina and Russia have had a gradual 
reduction in the inflation after the peak of 2002 (41.0%) and 1999 (85.7%), respectively, 
due to the huge exchange rate devaluation in 2001–02 in Argentina and the subsequent 
Russian crisis in 1998. For some countries (China, India, and Russia) the stability of the 
nominal exchange rate had an important role for price-stabilization purposes over the 
period (Paula 2008). So, IT and non-IT countries have experienced similar reductions in 
inflation in recent years. Theory suggests that “flexible” IT stabilizes both inflation and 
output. However, there is no clear evidence that emerging countries that adopted IT have 
had a better performance in GDP terms (both in terms of output growth and GDP 
coefficient of variation) when compared to the emerging countries that do not adopt IT; the 
evidence as reported in this paper (figures 5 and 7) is very clear on this point. Indeed, China 
and India are amongst the countries that have had the highest output growth in recent years 
and they are non-IT countries (their growth rates are 10.3% and 6.3%, respectively, for the 
years 1991–2007). Consequently, there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves 
performance in emerging economies as measured by the behavior of inflation and output. 
This finding suggests that better performance resulted from something other than IT.
23 
                                                 
22 In table 3 (IT emerging countries) we consider the time “before IT” (ten years before the implementation of 
IT), while in table 4 (non-IT emerging countries) we divide this group of countries into two periods, 1991–
1998 and 1999–2007, so that this division allows a better comparison with Brazil’s performance since this 
country adopted the IT framework in 1999. 
23 One might argue that these findings are due to specific economic problems of emerging countries, problems 
that developed countries are not faced with, and thus IT might be better suited for these countries. However, a   21
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recent paper on OECD countries shows that this is not the case: comparing seven OECD countries that 
adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s to thirteen that did not, Ball and Sheridan (2003) find that, on 
average, there is no evidence that IT improves performance as measured by the behavior of inflation, output, 
and interest rates. They conclude that “the formal and institutional aspects of targeting—the public 
announcements of targets, the inflation reports, the enhanced independence of central banks—are not 
important. Nothing in the data suggests that convert targets would benefit from adopting explicit targets” 
(Ball and Sheridan 2003: 29, italics added). See also Angeriz and Arestis (2007a, 2007b, 2008).  
   Before IT  After IT 
Country Inflation  GDP  Inflation  GDP 
  Average  SD  CV Average SD CV Average SD CV Average SD  CV 
Brazil 405.17  911.83  2.25 1.97  3.00 1.52 7.22 2.83 0.39 3.06 1.92  0.63 
Chile 20.38  5.46  0.27 2.92  6.87 2.35 6.32 4.77 0.75 5.57 3.02  0.54 
Colombia 23.03  4.70  0.20 3.64  1.62 0.44 6.61 1.67 0.25 3.21 3.40  1.06 
Mexico 20.34  13.20  0.65 3.37  3.59 1.07 5.71 2.99 0.52 3.05 2.09  0.69 
South Africa  7.40  2.48  0.34 2.20  1.92 0.87 5.68 4.35 0.77 4.53 0.91  0.20 
 
SD = standard deviation; CV = coefficient of variation (SD/average) 
 
Note: Before IT / After IT: (i) Brazil = 1989–1998/1999–2007; (ii) Chile = 1981–1990/1991–2007; (iii) 
Colombia = 1989–1998/1999–2007; (iv) Mexico = 1989-1998/1999-2007; and (v) South Africa = 1992–
2001/2002–2007.  
   1991–1998  1999–2007 
Country Inflation  GDP  Inflation  GDP 
  Average  SD  CV Average SD  CV Average SD  CV Average SD  CV 
Argentina  12.66  28.58  2.26  5.86  4.25  0.72  7.95  13.19 1.66  2.48  7.69  3.10 
China   8.94  9.01  1.01  11.04  2.42  0.22  1.67  2.33  1.40  9.59  1.32  0.14 
India  10.12  3.58  0.35  5.39  1.77  0.33  4.14  1.97  0.47  7.08  2.12  0.30 
Russia  222.21  854.60  3.85  - 6.69  5.18  - 0.77 15.96  8.45  0.53  6.95  1.59  0.23 
 
SD = standard deviation; CV = coefficient of variation (SD/average) 
   22
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(b) The picture in Latin American countries should be interpreted with due attention given 
to the fact that these countries have suffered currency crises recently: Mexico in 1994–95, 
Brazil in 1998–99 and 2002, and Argentina in 2001–2002. Such crises have had big effects 
on both inflation and GDP in these countries. Argentina, after the experience of 
hyperinflation (1989–1990), adopted a currency board in 1991 and the inflation rate 
declined sharply during the 1990s. In 2002, the country had a serious currency crisis and, as 
result, a sharp recession in 2001–2002 took place, followed by a rapid recovery after the 
crisis. Indeed, and since 2006, the inflation rate has increased in Argentina. Mexico has had 
poor economic performance with declining inflation after the 1994 Tequila crisis. Although 
general conclusions are difficult to derive in the case of Latin America in view of the fact 
that IT is a recent import in these countries, a general observation emerges from this 
experience: in three cases—Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—economic performance 
worsened since their adoption of IT (table 3). Chile is an exception; it is the single Latin 
American country that has had real GDP growth above 5% (from 1991 to 2007 the average 
growth rate was 5.6% per year). Non-IT countries have had similar experiences (table 4). 
 
(c) Although there is a clear downward trend in inflation in emerging countries, Brazil is an 
interesting case. Inflation has remained high in relation to other IT countries over the 
relevant period; from 1999 to 2007, the average inflation rate was 7.2%. However, the 
coefficient of variation is the lowest over the same period (table 3). Furthermore, Brazil’s 
GDP performance has been poor compared to other “big” emerging countries; from 1999 to 
2007, the average growth rate was 3.0%, as compared to the average of the other countries 
in the BRIC group (figure 4).  
 
(d) In Brazil, as argued earlier, nominal and real interest rates have been high and exchange 
rate volatility has been considerable (figures 1 and 2). The combination of high interest 
rates and exchange rate volatility has contributed to low economic growth and a pass-
through effect from exchange rate to inflation. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have summarized the theoretical aspects of IT and the principles that govern its 
implementation in the case of Brazil. It is clear from this analysis that the authorities in 
Brazil adhere religiously to the theoretical principles of the IT framework. We have 
examined the experience of Brazil with IT and compared it with the experience of the pre-
IT period, as well as with the experience of other countries—both IT and non-IT.  
  Two general conclusions emerge from this analysis. IT countries appear to have 
been successful in taming inflation, but so have non-IT countries. Furthermore, although 
Brazil has implemented IT as the theory of the framework suggests, inflation rates over the 
IT period have been high. Brazil has one of the highest interest rates in the world and it has 
been maintained at this high level for awhile. The BCB has to maintain very high interest 
rates in its attempt to control inflation. High interest rates have been associated with poor 
economic growth performance and deterioration of other macroeconomic variables, such as 
public debt. It appears that we have a rather bad economic scenario in Brazil: low economic 
growth with relatively high inflation. 
  Our results conform to recent contributions on the IT experience of a number of 
Latin American countries. Especially so with the Eichengreen’s (2002) contention that IT is 
more complicated in countries like the Latin American ones, essentially for three main 
reasons: their economies are exposed to financial and international commodity shocks 
because of the liberalization of the balance of payments trade, which means liberalization 
of financial and capital accounts; second, their liabilities are almost dollarized; and finally, 
their policy-makers lack credibility. The first and the second reasons are particularly 
pertinent in the case of Latin American countries. Openness exposes these economies to 
disturbances that emanate from exchange rate fluctuations that cause pass-through inflation. 
Liability dollarization affects financial institutions because, in general terms, the banking 
systems of Latin American countries are weak and, as such, they bring financial 
vulnerability when external shocks occur. However, Paula and Alves Jr. (2003) 
demonstrate that this is not typical of the Brazilian banking sector in recent years. 
Moreover, IT is essentially too rigid for these countries because it affects the economic 
growth and exchange rate flexibility that is required under such a regime of monetary rules.   26
The latter can cause financial instability, a very real possibility in these countries, as history 
has vividly demonstrated. Schmidt-Hebel and Werner (2002: 2) are very clear on the 
dangers of IT: “all Latin American inflation targeters are open economies that employ 
floating exchange rate regimes … [and] are subject to large external shocks and significant 
exchange rate volatility, and the exchange rate may therefore play an important role in the 
conduct of monetary policy under inflation targeting.” Exchange rate market volatility 
generates frequent changes to inflation rates and results in countries not being able to meet 
their inflation targets. 
   The larger external shocks faced by Latin American countries affect the exchange 
rate and, consequently, the inflation rate, leading to higher interest rates to curb the 
inflationary pressures. As a result, these economies, in general, are confronted by higher 
volatility of interest rates and exchange rates. In this context, “monetary policy in emerging 
economies may therefore be more sensitive to exchange rate movements both indirectly 
(because of pass-through effects on inflation) and directly (because the exchange rate is an 
additional argument in central bank objective functions, reflecting their concern for 
devaluation-induced bank failures and domestic recessions)” (Schmidt-Hebel and Werner 
2000: 15). In other words, the pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation is 
larger and more significant in the Latin American economies than in industrial countries 
because the former have a substantially higher degree of openness, a history of high 
inflation, and low central bank credibility. In addition, Latin American countries present 
large mismatches between foreign currency assets and liabilities, which bring two adverse 
shocks: self-fulfilling attacks and financial crises on the country’s asset, as well as domestic 
recession following large exchange rate depreciations. It is the case that Latin American 
countries are susceptible to supply shocks, perhaps more so than many other countries, than 
to demand shocks. To the extent that this is validated, IT might not work as effectively as in 
those countries where demand shocks dominate over supply shocks. Brazil is no exception 
and these conclusions are applicable with some force in the case of this country.    27
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